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Chapter 7 
 
 
 
A FACTOR ENDOWMENT EXPLANATION FOR 
CHINA‘S EMERGENCE AS AN INTERNATIONAL 
TRADING POWER: CALIBRATING THE DORNBUSCH-
FISCHER-SAMUELSON MODEL FOR  
CHINA‘S TRADE, 1968-2008 
 
 
Roger White* 
Whittier College, CA, US 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Much has been made of the rise of China‘s economy and its emergence as a global 
trading power. Standard trade theory holds that comparative advantage is the basis for 
mutually beneficial exchange and, as such, it is the basis for international trade. In this 
chapter, we examine changes in labor supplies, capital stocks, and technology as possible 
explanations for the rise of China as an international trading power. Calibration of the 
Dornbusch-Fisher-Samuelson model suggests that China has gained comparative 
advantage relative to the US and to the cohort of high income countries considered in this 
study. Even though US production has increased since 1968 at both the extensive margin 
and at the intensive margin, China‘s emergence as a trading power may have adversely 
affected US labor. To discern the extent of labor market effects that may be attributable 
to increased trade, and particularly the effects of increased trade with China, we conduct 
a regression analysis using data for the years 1972-2007 to explore trade-induced changes 
in industry-level employment and average wages for both production workers and non-
production workers in the US manufacturing sector. Among other findings, greater 
import penetration from China has negatively affected employment of both production 
workers and non-production workers, and increased exports to China have had a limited 
positive effect on the average wages of non-production workers. 
 
Keywords: China, Comparative advantage, Exports, Imports, Manufacturing 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In December 1978, China embarked on a series of transformative economic reforms that 
emphasized the adoption of capitalist market principles. The reforms and associated open-
door policies led China‘s economy to become integrated into the global economy by way of 
increased international trade and investment flows. China‘s trade volume (i.e., the sum of its 
exports and imports) ranked 29th in the world in 1978 at $64.5 billion; however, by 2011, its 
trade volume had increased, in real terms, to $2.72 trillion, second only to the United States as 
the world‘s top trading country [18]. Thus, during this period, China‘s trade volume increased 
at an average annual rate of 12 percent. This growth in trade volume coincided with a period 
during which China‘s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at a robust average annual 
rate of nearly 10 percent.  
The importance of trade as a determinant of economic growth is established in Frankel 
and Romer [7]. Rather than focusing on the relationship between China‘s increased trade 
volume and its economic growth, in this chapter we explore changes in relative factor 
endowments (i.e., capital, labor, and technology) as the underlying basis for China‘s 
emergence as an international trading power. Specifically, we apply data for China and 97 
countries for which complete data are available during the period from 1960 through 2008 to 
the Dornbusch-Fisher-Samuelson (DFS) model of comparative advantage [2]. We calibrate 
the DFS model to consider changes in China‘s factor endowments relative to i) the full cohort 
of 97 trading partners, ii) the United States, and iii-vii) cohorts of trading partners that are 
categorized by World Bank income classifications (i.e., high, middle, upper middle, lower 
middle, and low income countries). The calibration exercises provide insights/expectations 
regarding shifts in China‘s comparative advantage.  
The DFS model extends the factor endowments approach to comparative advantage 
determination introduced by Ricardo [16] and extended by Heckscher [9] and Ohlin [15]. 
Emphasizing the contribution of Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson, Krugman [13] described 
the model as ―160 years of international economics in one paper.‖ Heuristically, the model 
permits consideration of the impacts of changes in relative labor supplies, advances in 
technology, and changes in capital stocks, either in isolation or collectively, on comparative 
advantage. We rely on the most basic version of the DFS model as it is sufficient for the 
purpose of motivating an empirical examination of the potential influences of trade on 
industry-level employment and average wages in the US manufacturing sector.  
Between 1968 and 2008, the rest of the world (i.e., the 97 trading partners in our dataset), 
realized growth in its collective labor force and capital stock and it experienced technology 
gains. China, however, experienced even larger increases in the size of its labor force, its 
capital stock, and the level of technology embodied in its output. The more rapid growth in 
factor endowments for China has implications for factor productivity and factor prices which, 
in turn, affects product prices and the range of products for which China and the rest of the 
world hold comparative advantage in the production of. Because changes in factor 
endowments have implications for production, it follows that they also affect the pattern of 
international trade.  
David Ricardo formalized the concept of comparative advantage as the basis for 
mutually-beneficial exchange. All trading partners hold a comparative advantage in the 
production of at least one good or service (i.e., each trading partner can produce at a lower 
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opportunity cost than another producer). In Ricardo‘s example, Britain ultimately produces 
and exports cloth to Portugal in exchange for port wine. The result is that, in aggregate, 
consumers in both Britain and Portugal are able to consume more cloth and more port wine 
than if the countries remained in isolation. Both countries benefit in a macro sense from the 
voluntary exchange; however, wine producers in Britain and cloth producers in Portugal, 
driven out of business by more efficiently-produced imports, are worse off as a result of the 
exchange, and cloth consumers in Britain and wine consumers in Portugal are worse off due 
to higher product prices. In other words, standard trade theory predicts that specialization and 
trade in accordance with comparative advantage will produce ―winners‖ and ―losers‖ on a 
micro level. The net benefits, however, are expected to be positive – again, in a macro sense – 
as the gains received by the winners exceed the losses incurred by the losers.  
Our econometric analysis examines the effects of increased trade, particularly increased 
trade with China, on workers in the US manufacturing sector. Specifically, we examine data 
for 75 3-digit Census of Population Industrial Classification (CIC) industries in the US 
manufacturing sector during the period from 1972 through 2007 to determine the extent to 
which increased trade flows affect industry-level employment and average annual wages for 
production and non-production workers. Effectively, calibration of the DFS model allows for 
examination of the underlying basis for observed increases in trade, and our econometric 
analysis considers the potential effects of this trade on US workers.  
We proceed as follows. We next introduce the DFS model and then glean predicted shifts 
in comparative advantage by calibrating the model. This is followed by a presentation of the 
findings from our econometric analysis. We end with final thoughts and conclusions. 
 
 
A DORNBUSCH-FISHER-SAMUELSON MODEL PRIMER  
 
Establishing an Initial Equilibrium 
 
Considering all countries other than China as ―foreign‖, and identifying these countries 
by ―*‖, we begin by assuming that both China and foreign are able to produce and consume 
large numbers of goods. Denoting these goods with the lowercase letter ‗z‘, we order all z 
goods along a continuum that ranges in value from zero to one to produce an index of goods 
identified as Z. We next define a(z) and a*(z) as the unit labor requirements for the z
th
 good in 
China and foreign, respectively. Combining the unit labor requirements as  results in a 
measure of China‘s productivity to foreign‘s productivity in terms of the z
th
 good. Using this 
ratio, we rank all goods along the (0, 1) continuum in descending order of China‘s 
comparative advantage. Graphically, we plot the resulting A(z) schedule, , 
against our index of goods, Z, in Figure 1. 
To determine which goods will be produced in China and which will be produced in 
foreign, we must consider the ratio of nominal wages in China to nominal wages in foreign:
 
= . This ratio is measured on the y axis in Figure 1. Because the DFS model is a long-
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)(*
)(
za
za
ZA 
*w
w
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run model, full-employment and perfect competition are assumed. Perfectly competitive 
markets imply that the cost of producing a given good z in China is p(z) = wa(z). Likewise, 
the cost of producing the same good in foreign is p*(z) = w*a*(z). The good, z, will be 
cheaper to produce in China if wa(z) < w*a*(z), or, equivalently, if . Thus, as 
noted in Figure 1, for a given A(z) schedule, the ratio of China-to-foreign nominal wage rates 
establishes the pattern of comparative advantage and, hence, the pattern of international 
specialization.  
 
 
Figure 1. Initial Equilibrium in the DFS Framework. 
In Figure 1,  represents the marginal good that both countries produce (i.e., the good for 
which ). All goods to the left of  along the continuum will be produced in China 
since , and all goods to the right of  will be produced at foreign because
. This means that the range of the continuum for which China holds comparative 
advantage (CA) is given as 0 , and the range of the continuum for which foreign holds 
comparative advantage in production (CA*) is given as 1.  
To establish a value for , we must add the B(z) schedule to Figure 1. This requires 
invoking a simplifying assumption that all consumers spend a constant fraction of their 
income on each z good. This restricts movement of the B(z) schedule to represent only 
changes in relative labor supplies. We define G(z) to be the fraction of world income spent on 
China-produced goods, and we assume that these expenditure shares remain constant. The 
)(zA
w/w*  
B(z) = G(z)/(1-G(z)) x L*/L
              Az
              
        Az
           A(z) = a*(z)/a(z)
Z (Index of Goods)
0 1
         CA                 CA*
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total value of spending on China‘s production is given by the product of the nominal wage 
rate, w, and the labor supply, L, or the product of G(z) and world income. Since world income 
is the sum of China‘s income and foreign‘s income, we have that wL = G(z)(wL+w*L*). 
Solving for  (i.e., ) results in . Thus, our expression for 
the B(z) schedule, illustrated in Figure 1, is given as .  
 
 
Examples of Comparative Statics Using the DFS Model 
 
In Panel A of Figure 2, we illustrate a hypothetical increase in L relative to L* which, all 
else equal, causes the B(z) schedule to pivot down. This pivot moves us to a new equilibrium 
where the B(z)‟ schedule intersects the A(z) schedule and decreases to . The resulting 
gain in comparative advantage for China (i.e., the loss of comparative advantage by foreign) 
is illustrated by the movement along the x axis from  to  ?. The basis for the change in 
comparative advantage is intuitive. To ensure full-employment, the increase in L relative to 
L* produces a decrease in w relative to w*, and as decreases we see that p(z) decreases 
relative to p*(z).  
Similar to the example of an increase in L relative to L*, we can trace the comparative 
statics associated with changes in relative capital stocks (K and K*) or technology levels (T 
and T*) to determine corresponding changes in comparative advantage. Increases in K* or T* 
lower the foreign unit labor requirement (a*(z)). Likewise, an increase in either K or T would 
lower China‘s unit labor requirement (a(z)). The effects of changes in capital stocks and 
technology levels are analogous in terms of shifting the A(z) schedule and, thus, in affecting 
price levels (p(z) and/or p*(z)) and in the determination of comparative advantage.  
Assuming that the foreign capital stock, K*, increases relative to China‘s capital stock, K, 
we have that a*(z) decreases relative to a(z) and, as a result, the A(z) schedule shifts down to 
A(z)‟ and a new equilibrium is established at the intersection of the A(z)‟ schedule and the 
B(z) schedule. This is illustrated above in Panel B of Figure 2. As a result of the increased 
productivity of foreign labor, decreases to and foreign gains comparative advantage. 
This is illustrated by the movement along the x axis from   to  ̃. The basis for these dynamics 
is as follows. This increase in the productivity of foreign workers increases w* relative to w; 
however, the proportional decrease in is less than the proportional decrease in the A(z) 
schedule (as indicated by the vertical distances between and  and between the A(z) and 
A(z)‟ schedules). Thus, p*(z) falls to p*(z)‟. Since both changes in relative capital stocks and 
technology levels produce analogous shifts in the A(z) schedule, identical comparative statics 
apply in the case where T* increases relative to T. 
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Panel A: An Increase in L Relative to L* 
 
 
 
Panel B: An Increase in K* and/or A* Relative to K and A 
 
Figure 2. Examples of Comparative Statics in the DFS Framework. 
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Table 1. Possible DFS Outcomes 
 
Panel A: Home gains / Foreign loses Comparative Advantage 
Outcome    A(z)  B(z)  
1 + + No  
2 + + -  
3 - No  -  
4 - + -  
5 No  + -  
 
Panel B: Foreign gains / Home loses Comparative Advantage 
Outcome    A(z)  B(z)  
6 + No  +  
7 + - +  
8 - - .  
9 - - +  
10 No  - +  
 
Panel C: No change or indeterminable change in Comparative Advantage 
Outcome    A(z)  B(z)  
11 +
a
 +
a
 +
a
  
12 -
a
 -
a
 -
a
  
13 No  No  No   
a
 The outcome, with respect to comparative advantage, is dependent on the relative 
magnitudes of the shifts in the A(z) and B(z) schedules. 
 
Panel D: Outcomes that are not consistent with the DFS Model 
Outcome    A(z)  B(z)  
i + No  No   
ii + No  -  
iii + - No   
iv + - -  
v - + No   
vi - + +  
vii - No  No   
viii - No  +  
ix No  + No   
x No  + +  
xi No  - -  
xii No  - No   
xiii No  No  +  
xiv No  No  -  
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Possible Outcomes and (In)Consistencies within the DFS Framework 
 
Given possible changes in L, K and/or T relative to L*, K* and/or T*, there are 27 
potential outcomes – in terms of combinations of shifts of the A(z) schedule, pivots of the B(z) 
schedule, and the value of . Table 1 lists these outcomes and identifies, in Panel D, the 14 
that are inconsistent with the DFS model. An example of such inconsistency is a downward 
shift of the A(z) schedule – perhaps due to technological advancements in the foreign country 
relative to the home country – with no corresponding pivot of the B(z) schedule. The DFS 
model predicts that such a scenario would yield a decrease in . Thus, an observed outcome 
of no change (or an increase) in , is not consistent with the DFS model.  
In the next section, we present our calibration exercises involving the DFS model. We 
have identified the possible outcomes here since observation of an outcome(s) that is not 
consistent with the predictions of the DFS model would call into question the model‘s 
usefulness.  
 
 
DATA/VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND RESULTS  
FROM CALIBRATING THE DFS MODEL 
 
Variable Construction 
 
As has been noted, we begin our analysis by calibrating the DFS model for China relative 
to i) all countries, ii) the US, and, separately, to those countries classified as iii) high income, 
iv) middle income, v) upper middle income, vi) lower middle income, and vii) low income. 
The categorization of countries is based on the 1990 World Bank income classifications.
1
 
Countries were classified by their 1990 World Bank classifications, as this year is the nearest 
to the middle of the reference period. Further, the classification is static in that countries are 
categorized throughout the reference period to reduce variation caused by a country(ies) 
moving between cohorts. Data from the Penn World Table 7.0 [10] are used to complete the 
calibration exercises. Consideration of comparative statics requires data for capital stocks, 
labor supplies, and technologies for both China and the respective trading partners. Further, 
considering that the ratio of nominal wage rates, China-to-foreign, is depicted on the vertical 
axis of the DFS diagram, requires a measure of relative wages.  
The capital stock series was constructed following the methodology employed in 
Hummels and Levinsohn [11]. For all countries, the 1960 capital stock value is assumed to 
equal to 2.5 times the country‘s real GDP value. In subsequent years, the capital stock is 
estimated as the sum of the capital stock estimate for the prior year less 13.33 percent 
depreciation plus any new investment: . Following 
this methodology, given the depreciation rate, by 1968 the entire initial capital stock has 
depreciated and the capital stock series/estimates employed in our analysis are based solely 
on the timing and the levels of capital investment.  
                                                        
1
 Classifications are available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/OGHIST.xls. 



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Labor supply values are difficult to obtain or estimate for many countries, particular for 
the early years in our reference period; however, when data are available, there is a strong 
correlation (0.98) between labor force values and population values [18]. Thus, to facilitate 
the inclusion of more countries in our data, we employ population values as a proxy variable 
for labor supplies [18].  
Solow [17] residuals were estimated to quantify the levels of technology embodied in 
each country‘s output. Employing annual data over the 1968-2008 period for all 98 countries 
in our dataset, a two-factor (capital and labor) Cobb-Douglas production function was 
estimated. Due to the presence of panel-level heteroskedasticity and first-order serial 
correlation, the Feasible Generalized Least Squares technique was employed. The resulting 
coefficients were then employed in conjunction with annual estimates of labor and capital to 
estimate the corresponding levels of embodied technology. Specifically, 
. Finally, nominal GDP per capita values are employed as a proxy 
for nominal wages. As such, the variable does not capture wage income solely nor does it 
represent variation in wages within an economy. However, GDP per capita is a measure of 
average income. Absent a better alternative measure, its use would seem an appropriate 
substitute. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
N countries; 
obs. Labor: L Capital: K 
Technology: 
T 
GDP per 
capita 
All 
Countries   
(incl. China) 
98; 4,018 
 
19,579,284 
(69,652,379) 
539,084,289 
(483,032,058) 
1.6078 
(2.4866) 
8,881 
(10,254) 
All 
Countries   
(excl. China) 
97; 3,977  
 
13,677,447 
(36,227,406) 
532,470,729 
(468,944,387) 
1.5835 
(2.4859) 
8,954 
(10,280) 
China 
 
1; 41 
 
548,173,528*** 
(156,825,257) 
3,534,580,073*** 
(4,124,567,184) 
1.4119 
(0.2423) 
1,570*** 
(1,588) 
USA 
 
1; 41 
 
119,713,264*** 
(22,924,971) 
9,607,399,804*** 
(4,048,101,260) 
3.2836*** 
(0.1698) 
30,698*** 
(7,341) 
High Income  
(incl. USA) 
24; 984 
 
14,240,180 
(26,195,397) 
551,055,017 
(500,823,229) 
2.7030*** 
(0.1371) 
23,831*** 
(8,515) 
Middle 
Income 
40; 1,640 
 
8,428,057*** 
(12,408,130) 
563,061,174 
(510,365,007) 
1.1152*** 
(1.3425) 
6,425*** 
(4,750) 
Upper 
Middle   
Income 
11; 451 
 
12,441,490 
(19,451,884) 
691,705,364*** 
(612,688,060) 
1.8340 
(1.7510) 
11,362*** 
(5,637) 
Lower 
Middle   
Income 
29; 1,189 
 
6,905,721*** 
(7,787,910) 
514,265,102 
(456,615,708) 
0.8426*** 
(1.0269) 
4,552*** 
(2,516) 
Low Income  
(excl. China) 
33; 1,353 
 
19,631,084 
(55,721,884) 
130,140,838*** 
(156,691,472) 
1.2826*** 
(2.0454) 
1,198*** 
(1,297) 
Standard deviations in parentheses. "***" denotes statistical significance from the corresponding "All 
Countries (including China)" mean value at the 1% level of significance. 
 
it
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 Panel A: Relative Labor Supplies (L*/L) Panel C: Relative Capital Stocks (K*/K) 
  
Panel B: Relative Technology (T*/T) Panel D: Relative Nominal Wages (w/w*) 
  
Figure 3. Relative Changes in Factor Endowments and Nominal Wages by Comparison Cohort, 1968-2008. 
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Calibration Results, by Cohort 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the ratios for each of the four variables of primary interest over the 
reference period. The corresponding values for 1968, 1978, 1988, 1998, and 2008 are 
presented in Table 3. Focusing on the cohort of 97 trading partners (i.e., the cohort labeled 
―All‖), we see that the ratio of foreign-to-China labor supplies (L*/L) increased from 2.35 to 
2.52, a 7.24 percent increase, during the reference period. Similarly, the ratio of foreign-to-
China capital stocks (K*/K) decreased 86.21 percent from 38.16 to 5.26. We also see that the 
ratio of foreign-to-China technology (T*/T) decreased from 1.85 to 1.19, a decline of 35.5 
percent. Finally, the China-to-foreign ratio of nominal GDP per capita (w/w*) increased by 
more than 933 percent from 0.06 to 0.59.  
For the considered trading partner cohorts, we categorize observed dynamics into two 
groups. For the US and the cohort of high income countries, the calibration exercises indicate 
that the shifts in factor endowments are such that China has gained comparative advantage. 
For all other cohorts (i.e., all trading partners, middle income countries, upper middle income 
countries, lower middle income countries, and low income countries), the results of the 
exercise are ambiguous.  
We first consider the changes noted above for the ―All Countires (excl. China)‖ cohort. 
These changes are illustrated in Panel A of Figure 4. These same directional changes in labor 
supplies, capital stocks, embodied technologies, and nominal wages are found for all trading 
partners/cohorts considered except for the US and the high income country cohort. The 
increase in L*/L leads to an upward pivot of the B(z) schedule to B(z)‟. The decreases in K*/K 
and T*/T shift the A(z) schedule upward since improved technology and more capital per 
worker would lower the unit labor requirement for China more so than for the foreign cohort. 
We also see that the ratio of China-to-foreign nominal GDP per capita values rises. The 
change in comparative advantage is ambiguous since we do not know if the upward shift in 
the A(z) schedule is somewhat minor, as represented by the move from A(z) to A(z)‟, in which 
case China loses comparative advantage, or is larger, as is represented by the move from A(z) 
to A(z)‟‟, in which case China gains comparative advantage.  
 
Table 3. Observed Changes, 1968-2008, and Corresponding DFS Outcomes 
 
All trading partners  L*/L  T*/T  K*/K  
1968: 2.35 1.85 38.16 0.06 
1978: 2.17 1.52 34.81 0.08 
1988: 2.12 1.37 18.98 0.15 
1998: 2.26 1.35 9.94 0.28 
2008: 2.52 1.19 5.26 0.59 
% : 7.24% -35.50% -86.21% 933.62% 
 A(z),  B(z),  : + + + 
DFS Outcome (from Table 1): #11: Indeterminable change in comparative advantage. 
     
US  L*/L  T*/T  K*/K  
1968: 0.22 2.53 10.45 0.02 
1978: 0.21 2.52 6.63 0.02 
1988: 0.20 2.23 3.75 0.04 
1998: 0.20 2.21 1.99 0.07 
2008: 0.20 1.76 1.12 0.15 
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Table 3. (Continued) 
 
All trading partners  L*/L  T*/T  K*/K  
% : -9.03% -30.69% -89.24% 809.44% 
 A(z),  B(z),  : - + + 
DFS Outcome (from Table 1): #2: China gains comparative advantage. 
     
High Income cohort  L*/L  T*/T  K*/K  
1968: 0.73 3.42 16.47 0.02 
1978: 0.63 2.89 13.78 0.03 
1988: 0.57 2.53 7.93 0.05 
1998: 0.54 2.67 3.75 0.08 
2008: 0.54 2.43 1.79 0.17 
% : -25.13% -29.00% -89.15% 712.97% 
 A(z),  B(z),  : - + + 
DFS Outcome (from Table 1): #2: China gains comparative advantage. 
     
Middle Income cohort  L*/L  T*/T  K*/K  
1968: 0.52 2.03 5.70 0.08 
1978: 0.52 1.54 7.01 0.09 
1988: 0.53 1.55 3.18 0.20 
1998: 0.60 1.52 1.74 0.36 
2008: 0.67 1.23 1.12 0.69 
% : 28.90% -39.25% -80.39% 742.00% 
 A(z),  B(z),  : + + + 
DFS Outcome (from Table 1): #11: Indeterminable change in comparative advantage. 
     
Upper Middle Income 
cohort  L*/L  T*/T  K*/K  
1968: 0.20 2.25 2.74 0.07 
1978: 0.21 1.74 3.46 0.07 
1988: 0.21 1.67 1.72 0.15 
1998: 0.25 1.62 0.91 0.26 
2008: 0.28 1.39 0.54 0.51 
% : 43.51% -38.38% -80.42% 666.82% 
 A(z),  B(z),  : + + + 
DFS Outcome (from Table 1): #11: Indeterminable change in comparative advantage. 
     
Lower Middle Income 
cohort  L*/L  T*/T  K*/K  
1968: 0.33 1.87 2.96 0.10 
1978: 0.31 1.38 3.55 0.12 
1988: 0.32 1.45 1.46 0.27 
1998: 0.35 1.45 0.83 0.46 
2008: 0.39 1.11 0.58 0.89 
% : 20.14% -40.53% -80.36% 806.74% 
 A(z),  B(z),  : + + + 
DFS Outcome (from Table 1): #11: Indeterminable change in comparative advantage. 
     
Low Income cohort  L*/L  T*/T  K*/K  
1968: 1.10 0.32 15.21 0.39 
1978: 1.02 0.29 13.14 0.50 
1988: 1.02 0.28 7.48 0.90 
1998: 1.12 0.29 4.23 1.56 
2008: 1.30 0.35 2.26 2.52 
% : 18.35% 11.16% -85.16% 543.80% 
 A(z),  B(z),  : + +/-? + 
    DFS Outcome (from Table 1): #11: Indeterminable change in comparative advantage. 
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Panel A: Ambiguous Change in China's Comparative Advantage relative to All, Upper 
Middle Income, Middle Income, Lower Middle Income, and Low Income Cohorts 
 
 
 
Panel B: Gain in China's Comparative Advantage relative to the USA and High Income 
Cohort 
 
 
Figure 4. Predicted Change in China‘s Comparative Advantage, 1968-2008. 
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Again looking to Table 3 and focusing on the US, we see that the ratio of US-to-China 
labor supplies decreased over the reference period by roughly 9 percent. Thus, the B(z) 
schedule would pivot downward. The ratios of US-to-China capital stocks and technologies 
decreased by 89.2 percent and 30.7 percent, respectively, which would cause the A(z) 
schedule to shift up. Finally, the ratio of China-to-US nominal GDP per capita values 
increased by more than 809 percent. A like pattern of changes in relative factor endowments 
is observed when we compare China to the high income country cohort. The corresponding 
dynamics are illustrated in Panel B of Figure 4, showing China‘s gain in comparative 
advantage relative to the US (and to the high income country cohort) as represented by a 
move to the right along the horizontal axis from   to  ̃. 
As noted at the outset, the typical worker gains as a result of trade through greater 
purchasing power which results from the greater efficiency that is gained when production 
shifts following changes in factor endowments. However, it is also possible that some 
workers, as a result of the anticipated shifts in production, experience negative consequences 
(e.g., unemployment or reduced wages) due to trade. In the next section, we employ 
regression analysis to determine if Stolper-Samuelson effects, in the forms of lower industry 
employment or reduced average industry wages have been realized by US workers in 
response to increased trade. We analyze these effects for production and non-production 
workers separately, while placing particular emphasis on trade with China.  
 
 
TRADE AND U.S. MANUFACTURING  
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 
 
The Econometric Model 
 
To produce our baseline estimation equations, we adopt a framework utilized by Mann 
[14], Freeman and Katz [8], and Kletzer [12]. The general-form equation is given as equation 
(1).  
 
  
 (1) 
 
An analogous equation has the change in industry-level average wages  as the 
dependent variable.  is the difference operator, and ln denotes the natural logarithm. 
Equation (1) provides insight into the anticipated relationships between industry-level 
employment and average wages and the components of industry sales. Specifically, all else 
equal, employment  and wages  are expected to be positively related to increases in 
domestic demand  for domestic output. Similarly, a positive relationship is expected 
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between increases in exports as a share of domestic shipments 
 
and both employment 
and wages. On the contrary, an increase in imports relative to domestic shipments  is 
anticipated to be negatively related to wages and employment.  
Modifying the general form equations to include i) a vector of time dummy variables, , 
that control for unobservable variation in industry-level employment and/or average wages 
due to policy changes, ii) a vector of industry dummy variables, j, that control for time-
invariant industry-specific characteristics, iii) error terms, and , that are assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed, iv) a common intercept term, 0, and v) to avoid 
possible multicollinearity problems when performing the regression analysis, the change in 
total industry-level exports  as a measure of foreign demand for domestic output and the 
change in the import penetration rate  (i.e., imports as a share of total domestic market 
sales) in place of imports as a share of domestic shipments yields equations (2) and (3), which 
are our baseline estimation equations.  
 
 
 (2) 
 
 
 (3) 
 
To control for additional influences on employment, we expand the vectors  and 
, which include industry-level changes in technology, constructed as Solow residuals 
[17], and changes in capital-labor ratios that are also industry-specific. Industry capital-labor 
ratios are given as the value of plant and equipment divided by production employment. To 
control for business cycle fluctuations, the annual change in the manufacturing sector 
capacity utilization rate is included.  
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In equation (4), the vector Ljt includes industry production and non-production 
employment. DOMjt, representing domestic demand, is equal to industry shipments less 
exports plus imports. Foreign demand is given by EXPjt, while IMPPENjt represents import 
competition. Equation (5) is an analogous estimation equation where the vector Wjt includes 
average industry wages of production and non-production workers. 
 
` 
 
  (5) 
 
The relevant finding for US workers from the DFS calibration exercise presented in 
Section 3 is China‘s gain of comparative advantage. This suggests possible variation in the 
effects of exports and imports on domestic wages and employment across trading partners 
grouped by average income levels. More specifically, distilling the separate effects of, say, 
import competition by income cohort we may anticipate a stronger proportional influence on 
domestic employment if the import competition is from low income countries and a weaker, 
albeit still potentially negative, if from high income countries. Estimating modified versions 
equations (4) and (5) allow us to discern these cohort-specific effects. 
 
 
Econometric Results 
 
To examine the industry-level effects of trade on employment and average wages, data 
from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers [19; 20] for the years 2006 and 2007 have been 
appended to data for the years 1972-2005 that are from the NBER-CES Manufacturing 
Industry Database [1]. The resulting dataset includes US manufacturing industries categorized 
according to the 2002 NAICS classification system. Trade data, categorized according to the 
1987 SIC classification system (1972-2001) are from Feenstra [4; 5] and Feenstra et al. [6]. 
Trade data for the years 2002-2007, categorized according to the 2002 NAICS classification 
system (2002-2007) are from the US ITC [21]. Capacity utilization rates for the US 
manufacturing sector are from the FRBSL [3]. All data series have been mapped to the 3-digit 
Census of Population Industrial Classification (CIC) system. The resulting dataset includes 75 
3-digit manufacturing industries.
1
 While the regression models we estimate are dynamic 
equations, Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the static variables over the full reference 
period and for the first and final years of the reference period. 
In the typical manufacturing industry during the typical year, there were roughly 2.5 
production workers for every non-production worker. Annual wages were typically about 
55.6 percent higher for non-production workers as compared to production workers. About 
two-thirds (67.8%) of the sector‘s exports went to high income trading partners. Another 28.2 
percent went to middle income countries, 4.3 percent went to low- income countries, and 3 
percent went to China. Similarly, about two-thirds of the sector‘s imports (67.2%) were 
sourced from high income countries, while 22.2 percent of imports were from middle income 
                                                        
1
 See Appendix B for industry listing. 
jtjtjtjjt IMPPENEXPDOMW lnlnlnln 321  
jtjtt TECHRATIOKLCAPUTIL lnlnln 654  
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countries, 10.6 percent were from low income trading partners, and 7.7 percent of imports 
were from China.  
Comparing 2007 to 1972, we see a considerable decrease in the employment of 
production workers, a modest decrease in non-production worker employment, and slight 
increases in average annual wages for both production workers and non-production workers. 
Both exports and imports increased; however, the increase in imports (593%) was 
considerably greater than the increase in exports (382%). Exports to low income countries 
increased proportionally more (727%) than did exports to middle income (502%) or high 
income countries (323%). Likewise, imports from low income countries increased by a 
staggering 11,445 percent, while imports from middle income (1,280%) and high income 
countries (318%) increased proportionally less. Both exports and imports, at least in terms of 
manufactures, increased for all trading partner cohorts but shifted toward low income 
countries and, to a lesser extent, toward middle income countries and away from high income 
countries. It is noteworthy that both imports and exports increased proportionally more than 
did the size of the domestic market. Thus, the average import penetration rate increased as did 
the degree of import penetration that each cohort accounted for. Even so, it is the average 
import penetration rate from low income countries that increased, proportionally, the most: a 
near 50-fold (4,909%) increase from 0.17 in 1972 to 8.52 in 2007. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 1972-2007 1972 2007 
 N = 2,700 N = 75 N = 75 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Production Worker Employment 158,493 177,121 120,632 
 (166,004) (175,531) (131,237) 
Non-production Worker Employment 62,718 57,631 51,333 
 (71,604) (55,092) (57,915) 
Avg. Annual Production Worker Wages 31,785 32,655 33,224 
 (8,455) (6,831) (9,608) 
Avg. Annual Non-production Worker Wages 49,430 49,896 52,550 
 (7,822) (5,438) (9,859) 
Exports (2000 US$) 5,240 1,920 9,260 
 (9,530) (3,070) (14,800) 
Exports to High Income Countries 3550 1,370 5,790 
 (6,540) (2,300) (9,600) 
Exports to Upper Middle Income Countries 377 167 592 
 (730) (297) (1,140) 
Exports to Lower Middle Income Countries 1100 300 2,220 
 (2,350) (475) (3,650) 
Exports to Low Income Countries (excl. 
China) 227 79 653 
 (526) (158) (1,320) 
Exports to China 159 0 1,339 
 (223) (0) (1,078) 
Imports (2000 US$) 7,830 2,410 16,700 
 (16,900) (4,520) (28,000) 
Imports from High Income Countries 5,260 2,080 8,680 
 (12,300) (4,400) (17,700) 
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Table 4. (Continued) 
 
 1972-2007 1972 2007 
 N = 2,700 N = 75 N = 75 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Imports from Upper Middle Income Countries 508 130 909 
 (1,370) (450) (2,140) 
Imports from Lower Middle Income Countries 1230 172 3,260 
 (3,690) (418) (6,910) 
Imports from Low Income Countries (excl. 
China) 
832 
(2,760) 
33 
(116) 
3,810 
(7,470) 
Imports from China 605 0.0000 2,964 
 (1,080) (0.0000) (6,019) 
Import Penetration Rate 0.1461 0.0583 0.2669 
 (0.1565) (0.0558) (0.2271) 
Import Penetration from High Income 
Countries 0.0931 0.0491 0.1248 
 (0.0893) (0.0524) (0.1077) 
Import Penetration from Upper Income 
Countries 0.0095 0.0029 0.0117 
 (0.0172) (0.0061) (0.0160) 
Import Penetration from Lower Income 
Countries 
0.0204 
(0.0323) 
0.0046 
(0.0120) 
0.0452 
(0.0517) 
Import Penetration from Low Income 
Countries 
(excl. China) 
0.0231 
(0.0713) 
0.0017 
(0.0091) 
0.0852 
(0.1490) 
Import Penetration from China 0.0131 0.0000 0.0671 
 (0.0422) (0.0000) (0.1153) 
Domestic Demand (2000 US$) 53,000 42,100 64,800 
 (61,400) (42,000) (82,600) 
Capital-Labor Ratio 218,755 296,653 221,399 
 (326,132) (324,046) (251,711) 
Technology 2.18 3.97 10.60 
 (10.2) (34.3) (91.8) 
Capacity Utilization Rate 79.70 83.41 79.07 
 (3.84) (0.00) (0.00) 
Non-weighted industry averages listed. Domestic demand, export, and import values in millions. 
 
Estimating equations (4) and (5) allows determination of the respective influences of 
exports and import penetration on industry-level employment and average wages. We first 
estimate each regression model while allowing for separate effects for China and for all other 
trading partners. These results are presented in Table 5. To consider variation in the 
influences of exports to and import penetration from China and the cohorts that have been 
determined based on per capital income, we estimate modified versions of equations (4) and 
(5). Results are presented in Table 6. Due to the presence of panel-level heteroskedasticity 
and first-order serial correlation in the data, we employ the Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares estimation technique. Beginning with results presented in Table 5, we see that year-
to-year increases in import penetration from China, correspond, all else equal, with reductions 
in both production worker employment and non-production worker employment (columns (a) 
and (b), respectively). Given the functional forms of the estimation equations, we can say that 
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a one percent increase in import penetration from China for the typical industry corresponds 
with 0.28 percent and 0.86 percent decreases in production worker and non-production 
worker employment, respectively. A like increase in import penetration from other countries 
corresponds with a 0.21 percent decrease in production worker employment, a 0.69 percent 
decrease in non-production worker employment, and a 0.25 percent decrease in average 
annual wages for production workers (column (c)). For the same three estimations, we find 
that in response to a one percent increase in exports to China, non-production worker 
employment increases by 0.005 percent, while a like increase in exports to the rest of the 
world results in a 0.01 percent increase in production worker employment, a 0.02 percent 
increase in non-production worker employment, and a 0.001 percent decrease in average 
annual wages for production workers. 
Considering the remaining variables in Table 5, we see that increased domestic demand 
corresponds with higher employment and higher average wages for both production and non- 
production workers. Increases in industry-level capital-labor ratios correspond with lower 
employment of both production workers and non-production workers but is positively related 
to average wages of production workers. Technological advances correspond with lower 
production worker employment and higher average wages for non-production workers. As the 
magnitudes of coefficient estimates and the pattern of statistical significance for these 
variables are consistent across Tables 5 and 6, we restrict our focus to the trade-related 
variables from this point forward. 
 
Table 5. Estimated Trade-Induced Labor Market Dynamics 
 
Dep. Var.: 
 ln Prod. 
Employmentjt 
 ln Non-Prod. 
Employmentjt 
 ln Avg. 
Prod. Wagesjt 
 ln Avg. 
Non-Prod. 
Wagesjt 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 ln China Import  
  Penetration Ratet 
-0.2849*** 
(0.0870) 
-0.8649*** 
(0.2194) 
0.2260 
(0.9405) 
0.7355 
(1.5348) 
 ln All except China  
  Import Penetration Ratejt 
-0.2062*** 
(0.0295) 
-0.6877*** 
(0.0745) 
-0.2473*** 
(0.0319) 
0.0357 
(0.0521) 
 ln Exports to Chinat -0.0002 0.0050* 0.0015 -0.0026 
 (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0012) (0.0020) 
 ln Exports to all except  
  Chinajt 
0.0096*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0202*** 
(0.0078) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0005 
(0.0054) 
 ln Domestic Demandjt 0.1316*** 0.2103*** 0.1138*** 0.0762*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0188) (0.0081) (0.0131) 
 ln Capital-Labor Ratiojt -0.7655*** -0.2975*** 0.1085*** 0.0177 
 (0.0098) (0.0247) (0.0106) (0.0172) 
 ln Technologyjt -0.0012** 0.0001 0.0003 0.0017* 
 (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0010) 
 ln Capacity Utilization  
  Ratejt 
-0.0222 
(0.0967) 
0.0097 
(0.2438) 
-0.0192 
(0.1045) 
-0.1486 
(0.1706) 
Constant -0.0035 -0.0034 -0.0149*** -0.0053 
 (0.0053) (0.0133) (0.0057) (0.0093) 
Wald 
2
 19,213*** 1,324*** 1,762*** 689*** 
Log Likelihood 5,694.62 3,431.48 5,503.55 4,305.66 
Pseudo R
2
 0.8871 0.3512 0.4188 0.2198 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ―***‖, ―**‖, and ―*‖ denote significance from zero at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6. Estimated Trade-Induced Labor Market Dynamics, Cohort-Specific Effects 
 
Dep. Var.: 
 ln Prod. 
Employmentjt 
 ln Non-Prod. 
Employmentjt 
 ln Avg. 
Prod. Wagesjt 
 ln Avg. Non-
Prod. Wagesjt 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 ln China Import Penetration  
  Ratet 
-0.2861** 
(0.1147) 
-0.6793** 
(0.2893) 
0.0644 
(0.1240) 
-0.0503 
(0.2022) 
 ln Low Income Import  
  Penetration Rate (excl. 
China)jt 
-0.3316** 
(0.1353) 
-1.3992*** 
(0.3413) 
-0.4966*** 
(0.1463) 
0.1649 
(0.2385) 
 ln Lower Middle Income  
  Import Penetration Ratejt 
-0.2210** 
(0.1019) 
-0.4611* 
(0.2571) 
0.0174 
(0.1102) 
-0.1391 
(0.1796) 
 ln Upper Middle Income  
  Import Penetration Ratejt 
-0.1449 
(0.1296) 
-0.4658 
(0.3270) 
-0.6008*** 
(0.1401) 
-0.2993 
(0.2285) 
 ln High Income Import  
  Penetration Ratejt 
-0.1978*** 
(0.036) 
-0.6729*** 
(0.0908) 
-0.2071*** 
(0.0389) 
0.0959 
(0.0635) 
 ln Exports to Chinat 
 
0.0002 
(0.0018) 
0.0013 
(0.0046) 
0.0015 
(0.0020) 
-0.0029 
(0.0032) 
 ln Exports to Low Income  
  Countries (excl. China)jt 
0.00005 
(0.0014) 
0.0042 
(0.0036) 
0.0004 
(0.0016) 
0.0002 
(0.0025) 
 ln Exports to Lower Middle  
  Income Countriesjt 
0.0046** 
(0.0020) 
0.0122* 
(0.0052) 
0.0001 
(0.0022) 
-0.0010*** 
(0.0036) 
 ln Exports to Upper Middle  
  Income Countriesjt 
-0.0032** 
(0.0015) 
0.0004 
(0.0039) 
-0.0018 
(0.0017) 
0.001 
(0.0027) 
 ln Exports to High Income  
  Countriesjt 
0.0098*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0097 
(0.0073) 
0.0086*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0064 
(0.0051) 
 ln Domestic Demandjt 
 
0.1303*** 
(0.0074) 
0.2078*** 
(0.0188) 
0.1144*** 
(0.0081) 
0.0783*** 
(0.0131) 
 ln Capital-Labor Ratiojt 
 
-0.7655*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.2994*** 
(0.0246) 
0.1072*** 
(0.0106) 
0.0187 
(0.0172) 
 ln Technologyjt 
 
-0.0012** 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0014) 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
0.0017* 
(0.0010) 
 ln Capacity Utilization Ratejt 
 
-0.046 
(0.0972) 
-0.0380 
(0.2454) 
-0.0141 
(0.1051) 
-0.1496 
(0.1714) 
Constant 
 
-0.0031 
(0.0053) 
-0.0037 
(0.0133) 
-0.0148*** 
(0.0057) 
-0.0044 
(0.0093) 
Wald 2 19,304*** 1,336*** 1,779*** 707*** 
Log Likelihood 5.699.73 3,435.49 5,508.28 4,312.42 
Pseudo R2 0.8875 0.3533 0.421 0.2241 
See Table 5 notes. 
 
Table 6 presents coefficient estimates from the regression models that have been 
modified to allow for variation in the influences of exports and import penetration across 
trading partner cohorts. The negative consequences of increased import penetration on 
employment of both production workers and non-production workers are greatest if the 
source of the rising import penetration is the low income trading partner cohort. A one 
percent increase in import penetration from low income countries corresponds with a 0.33 
percent decrease in production worker employment and a 1.4 percent decrease in non-
production worker employment. By comparison, given the same one percent increase in 
import competition from China, employment of production workers and non-production 
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workers would decrease by 0.29 percent and 0.68 percent, respectively. Increased import 
competition from low, upper middle, and high income countries is also found to negatively 
influence average wages of production workers. With respect to increased exports, the pattern 
of significance is less clear. Higher exports to high income countries correspond with 
increased production worker employment and average wages. Likewise, increased exports to 
lower middle income countries correspond with increased employment for production and 
non-production workers alike. No significant effect, for employment or average wages, is 
reported for increased exports to China. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have employed data that span the period from 1968 through 2008 to calibrate the 
DFS model of Ricardian comparative advantage. The calibration exercise has allowed us to 
explore changes in relative factor endowments (i.e., capital, labor, and technology) as the 
underlying basis for China‘s emergence as an international trading power. Our evaluation of 
the DFS model serves two purposes. By considering changes in China‘s factor endowments 
relative to those of the full cohort of 97 trading partners, the United States, and cohorts of 
trading partners that have been categorized based on World Bank income classifications, we 
gain insights regarding changes in comparative advantage. Results from the calibration 
exercises suggest that China has gained comparative advantage relative to the US and in 
comparison to the high income country cohort during the reference period. For all other 
cohorts, the change in China‘s comparative advantage is ambiguous.  
The calibration exercises motivate our examination of the effects of trade on industry-
level employment and average wages in the US manufacturing sector. Examining data for 75 
3-digit CIC industries in the United States‘ manufacturing sector during the period from 
1972-2007, we find relatively small, yet statistically significant, negative effects of rising 
import penetration from China on employment of production workers and of non-production 
workers. These effects, however, are not particularly pronounced relative to reported effects 
for countries categorized as low income or as middle income (i.e., lower middle income or 
upper middle income). We find no evidence of significant effects of trade with China (exports 
or imports) on average wages for production workers or non-production workers. Likewise, 
we do not report significant positive/offsetting employment effects that are attributable to 
increased US exports to China.  
It is important to recognize that, due to more disaggregate data not being available, the 
analysis presented here involves the use of data that are classified at a relatively broad (i.e., 3-
digit CIC) industry level. Heterogeneity across industries, and even across firms within 
industry classifications, along with period/year specific variation make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to infer precise employment and wage effects. As a result, we choose to be 
reserved in our interpretations and in our conclusions. That being said, we do report 
significant influences of greater exports and rising import competition on industry-level 
employment and average wages. Additional research is needed to discern more precise 
estimates of trade-induced employment effects. 
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APPENDIX A: COUNTRY LISTING, BY INCOME CLASSIFICATION 
 
High Income (24): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States; 
Upper Middle Income (11): Barbados, Brazil, Gabon, Greece, Korea (Republic of), 
Mexico, Portugal, South Africa, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela; 
Lower Middle Income (29): Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cote d`Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Iran, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Romania, Senegal, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Zimbabwe; 
Low Income (34): Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Chad, China, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia. 
 
 
APPENDIX B: CIC INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATIONS 
 
100 Meat Products; 101 Dairy Products; 102 Canned and preserved fruits and vegetables; 
110 Grain mill products; 111 Bakery products; 112 Sugar and confectionery products; 120 
Beverage industries; 121 Miscellaneous food preparations & kindred products; 130 Tobacco 
manufactures; 132 Knitting mills; 140 Dyeing & finishing textiles, except wool & knit goods; 
141 Floor coverings, except hard surface; 142 Yarn, thread, and fabric mills; 150 
Miscellaneous textile mill products; 151 Apparel and accessories, except knit; 152 
Miscellaneous fabricated textile products; 160 Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills; 161 
Miscellaneous paper and pulp products; 162 Paperboard containers and boxes; 172 Printing, 
publishing, & allied industries, except newspapers; 180 Plastics, synthetics, and resins; 181 
Drugs; 182 Soaps and cosmetics; 190 Paints, varnishes, and related products; 191 
Agricultural chemicals; 192 Industrial and miscellaneous chemicals; 200 Petroleum refining; 
201 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products; 210 Tires and inner tubes; 211 Other rubber 
products, and plastics footwear and belting; 212 Miscellaneous plastics products; 220 Leather 
tanning and finishing; 221 Footwear, except rubber and plastic; 222 Leather products, except 
footwear; 231 Sawmills, planning mills, and millwork; 232 Wood buildings and mobile 
homes; 241 Miscellaneous wood products; 242 Furniture and fixtures; 250 Glass and glass 
products; 251 Cement, concrete, gypsum, and plaster products; 252 Structural clay products; 
261 Pottery and related products; 262 Miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral & stone products; 
270 Blast furnaces, steelworks, rolling & finishing mills; 271 Iron and steel foundries; 272 
Primary aluminum industries; 280 Other primary metal industries; 281 Cutlery, hand tools, 
and other hardware; 282 Fabricated structural metal products; 290 Screw machine products; 
291 Metal forgings and stampings; 292 Ordnance; 300 Miscellaneous fabricated metal 
products; 310 Engines and turbines; 311 Farm machinery and equipment; 312 Construction 
and material handling machines; 320 Metalworking machinery; 321 Office and accounting 
machines; 322 Electronic computing equipment; 331 Machinery, except electrical, not 
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elsewhere classified; 340 Household appliances; 341 Radio, T.V., and communication 
equipment; 342 Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies, not elsewhere classified; 351 
Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment; 352 Aircraft and parts; 360 Ship and boat 
building and repairing; 361 Railroad locomotives and equipment; 362 Guided missiles, space 
vehicles, and parts; 370 Cycles and miscellaneous transportation equipment; 371 Scientific 
and controlling instruments; 372 Optical and health services supplies; 380 Photographic 
equipment and supplies; 381 Watches, clocks, and clockwork operated devices; 390 Toys, 
amusement, and sporting goods; 391 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries. 
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